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Abstract
The secrecy problem, under certain hypothesis, is equivalent to satisﬁability of constraints involving
Dolev-Yao’s operator . Making some restrictions over these constraints, their satisﬁability has
been proven to be NP-complete. However, to check opacity [11] or some modiﬁed versions of
secrecy, there is a need to ﬁnd similar results for a larger class of predicates. This paper starts to
extend this decidability result to more general constraints allowing in particular inequalities and
gives a simple decision procedure based on a rewriting system.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, veriﬁcation of security protocols has been widely in-
vestigated. The majority of the studies focussed on demonstrating secrecy
properties using formal methods (see for example [4], [6], [5] or [9]). These
methods have lead to eﬀective algorithms and so to concrete tools for verifying
secrecy like those proposed by the EVA project [3] or the Avispa project [2].
The main result is that considering an active intruder and a bounded num-
ber of sessions in Dolev-Yao model (see [8]), secrecy is decidable and is an
NP-complete problem. One possible way to demonstrate this result is to use
constraints based on Dolev-Yao’s operator . This has been done for example
in [12] or in [14]. A Dolev-Yao constraint will be a conjunction of atomic
constraints of the form E  m, where E is an environment (i.e. a ﬁnite set
of messages), m is a message and both of them are potentially not closed.
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Thus, in this case, the secrecy problem is equivalent to satisﬁability of a given
constraint.
In this paper, after giving a formal deﬁnition of Dolev-Yao constraints, we
will investigate their satisﬁability. In a ﬁrst part, we will restrict ourselves
to ”well-formed” constraints. These constraints will form an extension of the
well-known set of constraints which satisﬁability is exactly equivalent to se-
crecy in Dolev-Yao’s model with a bounded number of sessions. This extension
will add the possibility to use the = operator. Thus, protocols which check
that a received variable is not a given one (for example, a protocol verifying
that a nonce has not already been used before) could be veriﬁed by checking
satisﬁability of this kind of constraint. Using a method based on term rewrit-
ing, satisﬁability of such constraints will be proved to be decidable and we will
provide a concrete decision algorithm. Moreover, one of the hypothesis over
well-formed constraints could be removed. This will deﬁne quasi well-formed
constraints which satisﬁability will be proved decidable too. In addition to
protocols checking inequalities, there are two main motivations when extend-
ing classical Dolev-Yao constraints. The ﬁrst one, leading to the deﬁnition of
well-formed, is to study opacity [11] instead of secrecy in the case of active
intruders. Opacity in this case will be equivalent to satisﬁability of a well-
formed constraint. The criterion deﬁning ”quasi well-formed” constraints is
useful when studying opacity too, so that we could model the unfolding of two
parallel sessions. An other use of these constraints could be to model attacks
performed by two distinct intruders that are not allowed to communicate. Ap-
plication of these constraints to opacity will not be entirely detailed here and
will be the object of a future paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will
brieﬂy recall the usual deﬁnitions leading to Dolev-Yao constraints and proper
deﬁnitions for well-formed and quasi well-formed will be given. Then, in sec-
tion 3, we will use a rewrite system to prove that satisﬁability of well-formed
constraints is decidable. Section 4 will extend this result to the case of quasi
well-formed constraint. In section 5, we will quickly explain why satisﬁability
of our constraints is NP-complete. Section 6 will show how these results could
be applied to check opacity with an active intruder. And eventually, section
7 will conclude this paper.
2 Dolev-Yao Constraints
Let A, X and F be three inﬁnite countable disjoint sets. A is the set of
atomic messages usually written a, b and so on. X is the set of message
variables (written x, y,...) and F is the set of functions (written f , g,...).
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Deﬁnition 2.1 Let Σ be the signature A∪{pair, encrypt}∪F where pair and
encrypt are two binary functions. The atomic messages are supposed constant
functions and each function f has a ﬁxed arity ar(f). Then a message is a ﬁrst
order term over Σ and the set of variables X, namely an element of T (Σ, X).
A message is said to be closed iﬀ it is a closed term of T (Σ, X), i.e. a term of
T (Σ).
In the rest of this paper, we will use the well-known notations 〈m1, m2〉 =
pair(m1, m2) and {m1}m2 = encrypt(m1, m2). The height of a message m
could be easily deﬁned recursively and will be noted |m|. The set of variables
used in a message m is noted var(m), this is not the usual deﬁnition of var
as we will consider that f(...) is ”atomic”:
var(a) = ∅
var(x) = {x}
var(f(...)) = ∅
var(〈m,n〉)= var(m) ∪ var(n)
var({m}n) = var(m) ∪ var(n)
The substitutions σ from X to T (Σ, X) are deﬁned as usual. Application of
σ to message m will be noted mσ (instead of σ(m)). If σ is deﬁned by xσ = n
and yσ = y for any other variables y, then we could write m[x\n] instead of
mσ. The domain of a substitution σ is the set dom(σ) of variables such that
xσ = x.
Using the pair operator, it is possible to introduce n-tuples. Then, we will
use the tn notation to denote tuples composed using n times the same message
t. Formally, tn is recursively deﬁned by t1 = t and tn+1 = 〈t, tn〉
We will use Dolev-Yao intruder’s model [8]. The intruder controls the net-
work: he could intercept any message, forge messages using its initial knowl-
edge and previously intercepted messages, and send these messages to other
agents usurping an agent’s identity. To forge new messages, the intruder uses
Dolev-Yao theory . If E is a ﬁnite set of messages (usually called an envi-
ronment) and m is a message, E  m means that m could be deduced from
E using the classical inferences. In this paper, we only consider symmetric
cryptography. However, all of our results would still hold when considering
public key cryptography but we will keep this hypothesis for simplicity’s sake.
Dolev-Yao constraints are predicates built using classical logic operators
and a new tertiary operator noted . This operator is used in atomic predi-
cates like T  m[U ] where T (environment), m (message) and U (environment)
could be non closed. This predicates’ intuition is that there exists a proof of
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T  m[U ] which is deﬁned as the classical  except for the decode rule.
T  {m}u[U ] u ∈ U
T  m[U ]
The only keys allowed to decode a message are the keys in U and these keys
are not to be proven deducible.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [Constraints] Dolev-Yao constraints are deﬁned according to
the following grammar:
C ::= ⊥|	|C ∨ C|C ∧ C|CA
CA ::= T  m[U ]|m = n
Where T and U are ﬁnite sets of messages, m and n are messages.
For a constraint C, the sets T appearing as left part of an atomic constraint
T  m[U ] in C are called environments of C. The classical notion of model is
used for operators like ∨ or =. We will extend it by saying that σ is a model
of T  m[U ] written σ |= T  m[U ] iﬀ Tσ, mσ and Uσ are closed and there
exists a proof of Tσ  mσ[Uσ].
Deﬁnition 2.3 [Model] A substitution σ is a model for constraint C iﬀ Cσ is
closed and σ |= C where σ |= . is the smallest predicate verifying the classical
inferences for 	, ∧ and ∨, and the two following inferences:
mσ = nσ
σ |= m = n
Tσ T mσ[Uσ]
σ |= T  m[U ]
Using standard boolean rules, any constraint could be transformed to C =∨
i Coi where Coi =
∧
CA. The Coi constraints are called the conjunctions
composing C. We will usually suppose that our constraints follow this form
as it is needed to check that they are well-formed or quasi well-formed.
Deﬁnition 2.4 [Well-Formed Constraint] A constraint C is said to be well
formed iﬀ none of the environment is empty and for any conjunction Co
composing C, the two following conditions hold:
• If T  m[U ] and T ′  m′[U ′] are in Co, then T ⊆ T ′ or T ′ ⊆ T (Environment
Inclusion).
• If T  m[U ] ∈ Co and x ∈ var(T ), then there exists T ′  m′[U ′] ∈ Co such
that x ∈ var(m′), U ′ ⊆ U and T ′  T (Variable Introduction).
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A constraint that only satisﬁes the Variable Introduction requirement and
such that there exists a same closed message m in all its environment will be
said quasi well-formed.
It is easy to remark that for conjunctions in a well-formed constraint,
there exists a constraint Tx  mx[Ux] in Co such that Tx is minimal and
x ∈ var(mx). This notation Tx will be used in the following. An immediate
property about Tx is that x /∈ var(Tx). Moreover, we could notice that any
well-formed constraint is quasi well-formed.
As we have now proper deﬁnitions for Dolev-Yao constraints, we will give
a very classical example of constraint. To achieve this, it is practical to be
able to formalize the classical Dolev-Yao constraint: message m is deducible
from the set of message T written T  m. This constraint could be described
using constraint with [] by quantifying on the order upon which keys are
compromised. m will be deducible iﬀ there exist k1,...,kn distinct keys in T or
m such that k1 is deducible without any decoding, k2 deducible using k1 only
and so on. At the end, m needs to be deducible from T using only keys k1 to
kn.
Proposition 2.5 Let m be a message and T a ﬁnite set of messages. Then,
for any substitution σ, the following equivalence holds.
Tσ  mσ ⇔ σ |=
∨
k1,...,kn∈keys(T,m)
(T  k1[]∧T  k2[k1]∧ ...∧T  m[k1, ..., kn])
This property could be extended to predicates with several  operators. If
environments of the predicate are ordered, it is possible to assume that keys
compromised for an environment T are compromised for T ′ verifying T ⊆ T ′.
Let us call the environments T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ ...Tn. Thus, we quantify on the
previous order that gives us k1,...,kα and for each environment Tj on the value
of ij such that in Tj , keys k1 to kij are compromised (and so, we only have to
consider i1 ≤ i2 ≤ ... ≤ in).
Proposition 2.6 For i between 1 and n, let mi be a message and Ti a ﬁnite
set of messages. If
∧
1≤i≤n Tiσ  mi is well-formed and T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ ...Tn, then
for any substitution σ, the following equivalence holds.
∧
1≤i≤n
Tiσ  miσ ⇔ σ |=
∨
k1,...,kα∈keys(T,m)
1≤i1≤i2≤...≤in≤n
(T1  k1[] ∧ ... ∧ T1  m1[k1, ..., ki1])
∧(T2  ki1+1[k1, ..., ki1 ] ∧ ... ∧ T2  m2[k1, ..., ki2])
∧...
∧(Tn  kin−1+1[k1, ..., kin−1 ] ∧ ... ∧ Tn  mn[k1, ..., kin ])
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This property gives the following result: secrecy is equivalent to satisﬁa-
bility of a well-formed Dolev-Yao constraint.
An Example: Needham-Schroeder Constraint
Secrecy with a bounded number of sessions in Dolev-Yao model could be
linked to satisﬁability of a well-formed constraint. This is explained in [7]
for example. The usual example of attack that could be discovered using
formal methods is an attack on Needham-Schroeder protocol [13] found by
Lowe in 1995 [10]. The constraint NS which satisﬁability is equivalent to the
existence of this attack is given below. As it describes an attack in Dolev-
Yao model, the environments describe the knowledge of the intruder and thus
veriﬁes Environment Inclusion and Variable Introduction. That is why, this
constraint is well-formed and its satisﬁability could be veriﬁed. The two ses-
sions considered here occur between A and the intruder C and between C
usurping A’s identity and B. To keep it as simple as possible, this example
uses public key cryptography. Let E be the initial knowledge of the intruder
C, E = {A,B,C,KA, KB, KC , K
−1
C }.
NS = E, {NC , A}KC  {x,A}KB
∧E, {NC , A}KC , {x,NB}KA  {NC , y}KA
∧E, {NC , A}KC , {x,NB}KA, {y}KC  NB
3 Decidability for Well-Formed Constraints
In this section, we will provide an original decision procedure for satisﬁability
of well-formed constraints. For such constraints using only , it is well known
that the satisﬁability problem is NP-complete: see for example [14], [12] or an
extension to XOR in [7]. Our decision procedure will work using a rewriting
system over constraints. We will have to prove that our system terminates,
that satisﬁability for our normal forms is decidable and eventually that our
system is correct and complete, i.e. models of a constraint are exactly the
models of this constraint once rewritten. Knowing that, we are able to provide
a decision procedure for satisﬁability which is to rewrite the constraint up to its
normal form and then to check satisﬁability on this normal form. Compared to
other proofs of decidability of satisﬁability for this kind of constraints (that are
easy to ﬁnd in the literature, see [12] as a starting point), our main objective
is to provide a very simple, yet extensible, decision procedure.
Deﬁnition of the rewriting system needs some explanation. Our rewriting
system is triggered by a condition. As we will check for termination without
considering that condition, this will not cause any problem. The ﬁrst step in
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our decision procedure is to test all possible uniﬁcations among sub-terms of
the diﬀerent environments and messages. This is done using a large quantiﬁ-
cation (∨ operator). After that step, two diﬀerent non-closed messages (that
are sub-messages of the original constraint) are supposed to be instantiated
with diﬀerent closed messages (i.e. they cannot be uniﬁed). Using that, an
atom a is deducible from T (using U) iﬀ a appears in T (protected only by
keys occurring in U). The same kind of idea is used for {} whereas the case
of 〈〉 is trivial.
Deﬁnition 3.1 The rewriting system → is deﬁned over well-formed con-
straints by the three following rules that will only apply if for all x ∈ var(T ),
Tx  x[Ux] occurs in the same conjunction with Ux ⊆ U .
T  a[U ]→	(1)
T  a[U ]→⊥(2)
T  f(m1, ..., mn)[U ]→	(3)
T  f(m1, ..., mn)[U ]→⊥(4)
T  〈m,n〉[U ]→T  m[U ] ∧ T  n[U ](5)
T  {m}n[U ]→	(6)
T  {m}n[U ]→T  m[U ] ∧ T  n[U ](7)
• Rule 1 is applied iﬀ a occurs in T protected only by keys that appear in U ,
else rule 2 is applied.
• Rule 3 is applied iﬀ f(m1, ..., mn) occurs in T protected only by keys that
appear in U , else rule 4 is applied. Thus, rule 1 and 2 are useless if we
consider atoms as constant functions.
• Rule 5 is the intuitive rule for pairs.
• Rule 6 is applied iﬀ {m}n occurs in T protected only by keys that appear
in U (this is the case where {m}n could be obtained using decompositions),
else rule 7 is applied (in the other case, {m}n is obtained with a composition
operation).
The condition expressed over T aims to force the execution order to follow
⊆. Therefore if T1 ⊆ T2, then the pattern T1  m1 will be entirely rewritten
before processing T2  m2.
Last remark, these rules are easy to extend to the case of public key cryp-
tography. In this case, in the condition of application of the diﬀerent rules,
”protected only by keys that appear in U” is to be replaced by protected only
by keys which inverses appear in U .
The ﬁrst thing to check is that after applying → to a well-formed con-
straint, the result remains well-formed. This is expressed by the following
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property.
Proposition 3.2 If C and C ′ are constraints such that C → C ′ and C is
well-formed, then C ′ is well-formed.
The second thing is to prove that our rewriting system terminates. Then,
it will be possible to transform any constraint to a constraint in normal form
that has exactly the same models. This is easy to show as when rewriting, right
members of each constraint are discomposed or the constraint is rewritten to
⊥ or 	. Thus, by taking a simple measure over constraint s(C) deﬁned by:
s(T1  m1[U1] ∧ ... ∧ Tn  mn[Un]) =
n∑
i=1
s(mi)
This gives us s(⊥) = s(	) = 0. And s is recursively deﬁned over messages by:
s(a) = 1
s(f(...))= 1
s(〈m1, m2〉)= s(m1) + s(m2) + 1
s({m1}m2) = s(m1) + s(m2) + 1
Using an order based on this measure, the following property is immediate.
Proposition 3.3 The rewriting system → terminates.
After transforming a constraint to its normal form, we want to check that
both have the same sets of models. Formally, if C → C ′ then for any substi-
tution σ, σ is a model of C iﬀ σ is a model of C ′. This will prove that if the
normal form is satisﬁable then, the original constraint is satisﬁable too and
that the reciprocal is true.
Proposition 3.4 The rewriting system → is correct and complete for well-
formed constraints.
Note that, to prove this result, the Variable Introduction hypothesis is used.
Else, rules would not be correct and complete anymore. For example, if we
consider the following constraint:
a, {b}a  x[a] ∧ a, {b}a, x  b[]
This constraint would be rewritten to ⊥ as b does not appear in a, {b}a, x
unprotected. But, by using x = b, we know that this constraint is satisﬁable.
That is why, most of the rules are only correct and complete if the Variable
Introduction hypothesis is respected.
Eventually, the last step is to show that satisﬁability for our normal forms
is easily decidable. First, normal forms of well-formed constraints are well-
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formed constraints. They have the form:
∨(
(T  x[U ]) ∧ (
∧
m = n)
)
At this point, every normal form that is well-formed is satisﬁable if the lowest
environment T0 is non empty (this is always true by deﬁnition of well-formed)
and if the conjunction of inequalities is satisﬁable. To prove that, let t be a
message in T0 (t always exists as T0 is not empty). As the environment T0 is
closed (this could be seen by applying the Variable Introduction hypothesis
to T0), t is closed. Then, for every variable in an atomic constraint, we will
use a message of the form tn. It is clear that the conjunction of predicates
using  is satisﬁed. And by changing values of the diﬀerent n, if the = part
is satisﬁable, we will satisfy it by giving to n a value lower than the number
of inequalities plus the number of variables. The intuition is that, given a
number n, if a conjunction m1 = n2 is not satisﬁed, then it satisﬁed for any
other number n′ = n.
We will use the σk notation which signiﬁcation xσk is the tuple composed
by k times xσ.
xσk = (xσ)k = 〈xσ, ..., xσ〉
Proposition 3.5 (Solving Inequalities) Let P be the constraint m1 = n1∧
... ∧ mj = nj where mi and ni are messages. If P is satisﬁable, then for
any substitution σ such that Pσ is closed and taking distinct values for any
variables in var(P ), there exists an integer k such that k ≤ j + 1 and σk is a
model of P .
Proof. The proof use the following lemma: let m and n be two messages, σ be
a substitution such that mσ and nσ are closed, and that xσ = yσ ⇒ x = y. If
there exists two diﬀerent integers i and j such that mσi = nσi and mσj = nσj ,
then we have m = n. 
This kind of property is very general and could be applied to other operators
instead of =. For example, the same thing holds for the ∼ operator introduced
in [11] and this will allow to prove decidability of satisﬁability for a similar
extension of the predicates deﬁned in this paper. This decidability (and NP-
completeness) will prove that the opacity problem when considering an active
intruder (Dolev-Yao’s model) and a ﬁnite number of session is NP-complete.
Eventually, satisﬁability is equivalent to satisﬁability of the = part. This last
satisﬁability is easy to check using for example negation of this conjunction.
This gives a constraint using only equalities. Then, by applying classical
uniﬁcation, it is possible to check that this ﬁnal constraint is always satisﬁed
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(hence is rewritten to 	 using uniﬁcation) or not (and thus that its opposite
is satisﬁable or not).
Finally, the main result of this paper is a consequence of all the former
properties.
Theorem 3.6 (Main Theorem) Satisﬁability of well-formed constraints is
decidable.
This result is not really new, it could already be found in [1] for instance.
However, the demonstration used here seems to be easier to adapt to other
cases. In particular, having ﬁrst order symbols like f , this theorem will apply
quite directly to show decidability of opacity in a next section.
An Example: Needham-Schroeder Constraint
The former rewriting system has been implemented in a prototype using
ocaml. However, it has been adapted so that it does not have to test all
the possible uniﬁcations. This makes the method easier to understand but
is very negative for performance. This is the reason why our algorithm does
only make uniﬁcation when it need them. For example, the rules 3 and 4
would be replaced by a rule trying all the possible uniﬁcation of f(..) and
the reachable patterns starting with f in the environment. The advantage of
this method is that by looking at the uniﬁcation requested by the rewriting
system, we obtain values for the diﬀerent parameters and this algorithm does
not have to look to all possible uniﬁcations but only to ”plausible ones”. In
the formal proof and other works, the general ﬁrst idea is to guess all possible
equalities between sub-messages and to get rid of them using the most great
uniﬁer (see [7] on how to adapt this to exclusive or). It has been tested on
the Needham-Schroeder constraint. Its result is of course that this constraint
is satisﬁable and the only possible variables’ values are: x = NC and y = NB.
During this check, ﬁve possible uniﬁcations have been tested. Three of them
involved two messages that could not be uniﬁed and so only two cases were
explored. One quickly lead to satisﬁability whereas the other one was not
satisﬁable. Adding to the initial constraint the inequality y = NB, we imme-
diately have that the constraint is not satisﬁable anymore. This gives us a
possible ﬁx for this protocol: if agent A was able to determine the origin of
nonce NB (by replacing it by a pair nonce, identity of the nonce’s creator),
then it would not be possible to perform this attack anymore. This is the idea
behind Lowe ﬁxed version of this protocol appearing in [10]. This ﬁx adds the
agent’s identity to the second message, hence allows to check if the identity of
the nonce’s creator is valid.
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4 Quasi Well-Formed Constraints
The previous theorem could be extended to quasi well-formed constraints.
There are at least two possible ways to demonstrate this.
• The ﬁrst solution is to notice that the only place where we use the ﬁrst
hypothesis is to prove that satisﬁability for normal forms is decidable. This
is the reason why we added the last hypothesis for quasi well-formed con-
straints, thus there exists a closed message common to all the environments.
The modiﬁcations to perform are to demonstrate the modiﬁed property:
Proposition 4.1 If C and C ′ are constraints such that C → C ′ and C is
quasi well-formed, then C ′ is quasi well-formed.
Termination is proved for any kind of constraints so this will not be a
problem. Correctness and completeness could be adapted too.
Proposition 4.2 The rewriting system → is correct and complete for quasi
well-formed constraints.
Eventually, when considering the normal form, the proof does not change:
using tuples of message m, it is possible to verify satisﬁability as message
m is deducible from any of the involved environments.
• The other way is to remark that a quasi well-formed conjunction is equiva-
lent to a conjunction of well-formed conjunctions. In the initial conjunction,
the atomic constraint T  m[U ] could be replaced by T  m[U ] ∧
∧
T ′ 
m′[U ′] where the conjunctions introducing the diﬀerent variables in T are
added and those introducing variables in the diﬀerent m′ (to formalize that,
we would need a ﬁx point). As the number of conjunctions in the initial
constraint is ﬁnite, the results are well-formed and ﬁnite conjunctions. The
rest of this demonstration will be shorter as it will use the results of the
former section. This is why, these conjunctions could be rewritten. And
so, we obtain an equivalent normal form which is a quasi well-formed con-
straint. As we have seen before, satisﬁability of this constraint is rather
easy to check. There remains the inequalities part to check but this could
still be done using the method described above.
Both of these proof skeletons allow us to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Satisﬁability of quasi well-formed constraints is decidable.
More than satisﬁability, we provide a decision procedure that has been
implemented and seems to perform quite well.
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An Example: Needham-Schroeder Constraint
As said earlier, our main motivation for this extension is its application to
opacity. However, there are other possible uses for it. The Environment
Inclusion hypothesis held because the environments represented the intruder’s
knowledge. As the intruder could only learn new messages, this set could
only grow and the hypothesis is not restrictive. However, by suppressing this
hypothesis, it is now possible to model distinct knowledge with the diﬀerent
environments. Concretely, this extension easily allows to model two intruders
that are not able to communicate between each other. For example, let us
consider a modiﬁed version of Dolev-Yao attack. There are two intruders
C1 and C2 such that there is a session between A and C1 and another one
between C2 (usurping A’s identity) and B. We want to know if it is possible
for one of the intruder to deduce one of the secret NA or NB. Let T0 be the
initial knowledge of our intruders {A,B,C1, C2, KC1 , KC2 , K
−1
C1
, K−1C2 }. Then,
the constraint becomes:
T0  {A, x}KB
∧ T0, {A,NA}KB  {x
′, y′}KA
∧ ( T0, {x,NB}KA  NB
∨T0, {A,NA}KB , {y
′}KC1  NA)
This constraint appears to be quasi well-formed but is not well-formed. By
using our decision procedure, we know that this constraint is not satisﬁable.
Thus, the two intruders need to communicate so that the classical attack over
Dolev-Yao’s protocol could be performed.
5 NP-Completeness
We will now discuss the complexity of our approach. First, satisﬁability of
well-formed constraints is NP-hard (see for example [15] or [14]). This is
the case for well-formed constraints that only involve . And as all of these
constraints are in the set of constraints that we are studying, our satisﬁability’s
problem is NP-hard. To show that this satisﬁability problem is in NP and
thus NP-complete, we will rely on the results presented in [14]. The authors
of this paper proved that given a satisﬁable well-formed constraint without
inequalities, there exists a model which size is polynomial in the size of the
constraint. The size used here is the number of diﬀerent sub-terms. The same
result holds for our method. Its result is a substitution σ such that the size of
xσ is polynomial in the size of the constraint. When solving the inequalities
part, the size remains polynomial: let |m|DAG be the number of distinct sub-
terms in m. Then it is easy to prove that |mn|DAG = |m|DAG + n − 1. So in
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the worst case, we only added the number of inequalities and variables to the
size of our model. Thus the DAG size of our model remains polynomial in the
size of the initial problem. That is why, we could conclude that satisﬁability
of well-formed constraints is NP-complete.
For quasi well-formed constraints, the exact same decision algorithm could
be used. This proves that satisﬁability for these constraints is also NP-
complete.
6 Application to Opacity
In this section, we will give a quick look at how the former method could be
used to prove that opacity is decidable when considering Dolev-Yao model.
In other papers, we only studied the case of a passive intruder. Here, we will
start to extend decidability results to the case of active intruders.
First, let us give an extended deﬁnition of  to the case of two envi-
ronments and two messages E,E  n, n′. This means that n and n′ are
deducible from E and E ′ by making the same operations on both environ-
ments. For example, {a, b}, {c, d}  〈a, b〉, 〈c, d〉 is true as both messages are
obtained by pairing the ﬁrst and second messages in the environments whereas
{a, b}, {c, d}  〈a, a〉, 〈c, d〉 is false as the messages could not be obtained by
the same operations. E,E  n, n′ is deﬁned on closed messages n, n′ and
closed environments E and E ′ by:
{n1, ..., nk}, {n′1, ..., n
′
k}  ni, n
′
i
E,E ′  n1, n
′
1 E,E
′  n2, n
′
2
E,E ′  〈n1, n2〉, 〈n′1, n
′
2〉
E,E′  〈n1, n2〉, 〈n
′
1, n
′
2〉
E,E ′  n1, n′1
E,E ′  〈n1, n2〉, 〈n
′
1, n
′
2〉
E,E ′  n2, n′2
E,E ′  {n1}n2 , {n
′
1}n′2 E,E
′  n2, n
′
2
E,E ′  n1, n′1
E,E ′  n1, n
′
1 E,E
′  n2, n
′
2
E,E ′  {n1}n2, {n
′
1}n′2
Note that E and E′ must have the same length (in fact, as these sets will
be supposed similar, this will not be a problem). Moreover, as we want to
perform the same operations on both environments, we need the environments
to be ordered. They could be represented using lists.
The deﬁnition of opacity (given for example in [11]) is that an intruder is
not able to distinguish a run where the property is satisﬁed from a run where
it is not. To distinguish two messages, the intruder could decompose them,
according to his knowledge but if he does not know the key k for example, he
will not be able to make the diﬀerence between two diﬀerent messages encoded
by this key k. However, in this section, we will only consider a very simpliﬁed
version of opacity. Let us consider a ﬁnite protocol P with a unique parameter
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v (called the vote) that could only take two values yes (protocol Py) or no
(protocol Pn). We will say that the value of v is not opaque (in fact, the
property v = yes is not opaque) iﬀ the intruder is able to produce yes and no
by doing the same operations on both protocols. The intruder has to perform
the exact same sequence of actions: for example if in the ﬁrst protocol, he
sends a constant A then receives a message that is a pair and eventually sends
the left part of the pair, he will have to do the same actions for the second
protocol. This will be equivalent to satisﬁability of the following constraint:
T0, T0  m0, m
′
0 ∧ T0;n0, T0;n
′
0  m1, m
′
1 ∧ ... ∧ Tn, T
′
n  yes, no
Where Ti = T0;m0; ...;mi−1. The messages mi and m
′
i are produced by the
intruder and sent to protocols Py and Pn. Then, the protocols replies are
messages ni and n
′
i. Both sessions are carried in the same manner and we ask
that at the end, the intruder is able to tell on which session v was equal to
yes and on which session v was equal to no.
To link our new constraint to Dolev-Yao constraints, let us introduce an
explicit binary function f for our extended  operator. The constraint could
be written
f(T0, T0)  f(m0, m
′
0)∧f(T0;n0, T0;n
′
0)  f(m1, m
′
1)∧...∧f(Tn, T
′
n)  f(yes, no)
Next, we will distribute the f function inside our constraint by using the
following distrib operator recursively deﬁned by:
distribf (f(〈m,n〉, 〈m
′, n′〉)) = 〈distribf(f(m,m
′)), distribf (f(n, n
′))〉
distribf (f({m}n, {m
′}n′)) = {distribf (f(m,m
′))}distribf (f(n,n′))
Else we have distribf (m) = m.
Applying the distribf function creates a constraint equivalent to the origi-
nal one but which is a Dolev-Yao constraint. This is formalized in the following
property which could be proved using induction over the proofs’ structures. If
E and E ′ are two environments, n and n′ are two messages such that f does
not appear in E, E ′, n or n′, then the following equivalence is true:
E,E ′  n, n′ ⇔ distribf (f(E,E
′))  distribf (f(n, n
′))
So, opacity is equivalent to satisﬁability of a Dolev-Yao constraint. Moreover,
this constraint is, by construction, well-formed. Thus, opacity as deﬁned be-
fore is decidable and we have an NP-complete algorithm to check satisﬁability.
However, we only studied a very restrictive version of opacity but we believe
that this result could be extended to the general opacity problem.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we gave a simple decision procedure to prove satisﬁability of
extended versions of usual Dolev-Yao constraints. Using a rewriting system,
this algorithm is easy to implement. Moreover, we believe that this method
could easily be used for other constraints derived from Dolev-Yao’s one. This
has been done through a prototype that performed well on simple examples.
An immediate application of these new predicates is to check the secret in
presence of two intruders that are not allowed to communicate. Then quasi
well-formed constraint will be useful as they allow to describe two ”branches”
of environments that do not have to be ordered by set inclusion. Each of these
branches will be described by a well-formed constraint. Further works include
of course linking more precisely these constraints to the opacity problem in
the case of an active intruder. However, there remains an open question: is
satisﬁability of general Dolev-Yao constraints decidable ? We did not manage
to prove that in the general (no hypothesis at all) case.
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